Gernot Wagner’s But Will the Planet Notice? is the book I would like to get my neighbors to read. The ones who use canvas shopping bags, take short showers, recycle, and think that is enough. The ones who think “environmental economics” is an oxymoron. The ones who think concepts like markets, incentives, and property are the roots of our planetary problems, not the keys to solving it.
Wagner can speak to these people as a member of the same club. He is careful to point out that he, too, pays his dues—no plastic bags, no meat, no car, and a day job with the Environmental Defense Fund. But he also has a Ph.D. in environmental economics. That means that even though he may live like your average green progressive, he thinks differently. He thinks recycling is nice, but not enough, and that only economists can save the planet.
Actually, I took the bit about economists saving the planet from
the jacket, not from the book itself. Wagner’s real argument is not that
economists, but markets offer the best chance of saving the planet. Markets
don’t guarantee success, but trying to work against them is a sure recipe for failure.
Wagner is a firm devotee of the idea that the polluter
should pay. His tool of choice for
putting a price on pollution is cap and trade, but he has no objection to
gasoline taxes, parking fees, highway tolls, property rights for lobster
fishers, and other incentive mechanisms as the specifics of each case dictate.
He is dismissive of the objection that “making pollution into a commodity”
removes the moral stigma associated with it. “From a moral perspective that’s
all well and good,” he says. “Too bad it doesn’t get us anywhere.” (It’s also
too bad he doesn’t expand on this point.. It is worth more than a one-liner.)
This book is much more than just another plea to put a price
on pollution, however. For Wagner, environmental economics isn’t only about
prices and markets, but also about broader issues of tradeoffs and
optimization. What offends him even more than polluters who don’t pay are dumb
regulations that do more harm than good.
He is especially devastating in his critique of the Endangered
Species Act. The ESA is perhaps the least economically inspired piece of
environmental legislation on the books, allowing for no tradeoffs or
optimization at all. Under the act, everything is all or nothing. If the barred
owl is not on the endangered list, it fends for itself until it qualifies. If
the spotted owl is on the list, there is, literally, no limit to how much is
too much to spend on protecting it. Ten million dollars to save a single bird?
Sure, it’s been done. Never mind that the largest expenditures often go to
species that are beyond saving while other conservation needs, like habitat
protection to keep other species off the list in the first place, are
underfunded.
What would be better than dumb regulations? Smart
regulations, of course. Wagner likes an idea advanced by Harvard
professor Martin Weitzman: Use DNA testing to measure the genetic distance
between species. If an endangered bird or fish (say, the spotted owl) has a
close but flourishing cousin (the barred owl), its loss would not have much
impact on overall genetic diversity. Genetic outliers should be the top
priority. Measure, maximize, optimize. That’s the real economic way of thinking
at work.
Weitzman’s work appears elsewhere in the book, as well.
Wagner spends a whole chapter elaborating the reasons for thinking climate
change is the planet’s number one threat. At first that might seem like
overkill, since, for the most part, he seems to address the book to readers who
already share his concern for the future of the planet. But it turns out he has
more to say than simply to reiterate the findings of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change. Following Weitzman, he explains why conventional
climate change research, which focuses on mean values and normal distributions,
misses the point.
The risk of climate catastrophe, he argues, is not like the
risk that your house will burn down, a case where normal distributions work
just fine. Instead, it is more like the kind of systemic financial risk that shook
the world after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Why so? Financial and climate
risks both have fat-tailed distributions. That makes it worth taking serious
precautions against “black swan” events that are very far from the mean—events
that, although not especially likely, would result in huge losses if they did
occur.
The consensus among mainstream climate scientists is a mean
expected warming of 2 to 4 degrees Celsius by the end of the century. Adapting
to such an increase would be costly and disruptive, but it would not mean the
end of life as we know it. But instead of the mean, Weitzman and Wagner (who
have worked together on the issue) argue that we should be focusing on the 5
percent probability that warming will end up way out in one of those fat tails,
say, 12 degrees or more. That would put half the world’s population in areas so
hot that a few hours out in the sun would be fatal—even for a person soaking
wet, with light clothing and a strong breeze.
The Weitzman-Wagner approach puts the precautionary
principle on steroids. With no change in the mean expected rate of warming, fat
tails triple the amount we should be willing to invest in climate change now.
To put it in dollars, if were willing to tax carbon at $20 per ton based on
conventional analysis, then we should be willing to tax it at $60 or more based
on fat tail math.
Despite these forays into high-octane theory, Wagner comes
across as neither a wonk nor a purist, but rather as pragmatic and even a bit
eclectic. Consider his spin on reducing pollution from automobiles. Economists
(myself included) have long argued that an increase in gasoline taxes would do
more good at lower cost than the current U.S. approach that features Corporate
Average Fuel Economy standards. Wagner accepts the argument in principle, but
points out that people don’t always respond rationally to price incentives. His
recommendation? Gasoline taxes plus
CAFE standards.
The bottom line? What I like best about the book is its
potential to deliver a plea for good policy in a way that penetrates the
factional divisions that have arisen within the environmental community. Property-rights
environmentalists from Montana, equation-scribbling Harvard academics, West coast
locovores and subway-riding New York vegetarians
sometimes seem more interested in their differences of rhetoric, ideologies,
and life styles than in their shared goals. I hope they all take notice of this
book even if the planet does not.
Originally published on Economonitor.com
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