tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2938311055760665357.post7185682502498627905..comments2024-03-27T03:49:12.592-07:00Comments on Ed Dolan's Econ Blog: Manipulating the Numbers: Motive, Means and OpportunityEd Dolanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08757995049056872214noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2938311055760665357.post-4878751211123499142012-07-18T16:02:02.496-07:002012-07-18T16:02:02.496-07:00Yes, the ratings would presumably be more reliable...Yes, the ratings would presumably be more reliable where the buyer of the securities is not subject to a bias toward risk taking. Regulatory reliance on ratings is one source of the problem, but in other cases, agency problems, limited liability, or other features might create a willingness knowingly to buy overrated securities.Ed Dolanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08757995049056872214noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2938311055760665357.post-27371043080185210292012-07-18T15:26:46.864-07:002012-07-18T15:26:46.864-07:00This is an interesting analogy. Isn't it the c...This is an interesting analogy. Isn't it the case though that ratings are problematic only where there is essentially a single buyer, namely govt regulators, as for mortgage securities, but that in other instances where the supply and demand works, as in the case of ratings of countries, that they are more reliable?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com